UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

2-20-2014

Brown v. Brown Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41483

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Brown v. Brown Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41483" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4812.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4812

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
HEATHER G. BROWN
Supreme Court Docket No. 41483-2013
Kootenai County No. 2010-4386

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
MICHAEL L. BROWN,
Defendant/Appellant,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the
First Judicial District of the State of Idaho
In and for the County of Kootenai
HONORABLE BENJAMIN R. SIMPSON
District Judge

HENRY D. MADSEN
Madsen Law Offices, P.C.
1044 Northwest Blvd., Suite B
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Phone: (208) 664-8080
Facsimile: (208) 664-6258

JENNIFER K. BRUMLEY
Amendola, Doty & Brumley, PLLC
702 N. Fourth Street
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Phone: (208) 664-8225
Facsimile: (208) 765-1046

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

Attorney for Plaintiff /Respondent

FILED· COpy
FEB 20 2014

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................................. 4

A. Nature of the Case ................................................................................................................. 4
B. Course of Proceedings ........................................................................................................... 4

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................................... 5
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. ..................................................................................... 7
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW ..................................................................................................... 8
V. ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................ 8
(a)

Did the District Court Err when it dismissed Michael's Appeal as untimely? ................ 8

(b)

Does IRCP 77(d) extend the time in which Michael had to file his Appeal? .................. 9

(c)

Is Michael entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal? .............................................. .1 0

VI. CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................... 11

2

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
Cases
State v. Barker,
123 Idaho 162,845 P.2d 580 (Ct.App.1992) .................................................................................. 8
Cline v. Roemer,
97 Idaho 666, 551 P.2d 621 (1976) ....................................... :..................................................... 1,9
Dustin v. Beckstrand,
103 Idaho 780, 654 P .2d 368 (1982) ......................................................................................... 8, 10
E1ec. Wholesale Supply Co., Inc. v. Nielson,
136 Idaho 814, 41 P.3d 242 (2001) ................................................................................................. 7
Gonzalez v. Thacker,
148 Idaho 879,231 P.3d 524 (2009) ...................................................................... .10
Henet v. Herret,
105 Idaho 358, 670 P.2d 63 (Ct.App.l983) .................................................................................... 8
Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Doe,
148 Idaho 124, 219 P.3d 448 (2009) .............................................................................................. 8
State v. Barker,
123 Idaho 162,845 P.2d 580 (Ct.App.1992) .................................................................................. 8
State v. Schoonover,
125 Idaho 953, 877 P.2d 924 (Ct. App. 1994) ................................................................................ 8
Rules
Idaho Appellate Rule 40 .................................................................................... 10
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 .................................................................................... .1 0
I.R.C.P. Rule 77(d) ........................................................................................ 9, 10
I.R.C.P. Rule 83 .............................................................................................. .10
Statutes
I.C §12-121 ................................................................................. '" ............... 10

3

I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
Appeal is taken from the District Court's Order of Dismissal and Judgment of Dismissal
of Defendant's Appeal of the Decree of Divorce-said order and judgment having been entered on
September 19,2013 (R., Vol. I, pp 159-162), wherein the District Court Dismissed Defendant's
Appeal as untimely. Defendant was served with the Decree of Divorce by the Court on July 24,
2013, just one (1) day before the Notice of Appeal was due to be filed. See R., Vol. I, p. 85 notes
by clerk #2242 as to "refaxed" Decree.

B. Course of Proceedings
On June 14, 2013 a Decree of Divorce was file stamped by the clerk for the Magistrate's
Division of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Kootenai,
Case Number CV-2010-4386, signed by the Honorable Scott Wayman (R., Vol. I, p.78). On
July 26, 2013 Defendant/Appellant, MICHAEL BROWN (hereinafter "Michael"), attempted
filing his Notice of Appeal from the Decree of Divorce (R., Vol. I, p. 100). However, since the
Notice was received by the clerk at 5:08 pm on the 43 rd day which was a Friday, the Clerk
recorded the Notice on July 29,20013. See Vol. I, p. 100 record of facsimile date at the top of
the page. On July 31, 2013 Michael filed an Amended Notice of Appeal (R., Vol. I, p.l00)
setting out the corrected dates of hearings. On September 3, 2013 Plaintiff/Respondent
HEATHER BROWN (hereinafter "Heather") filed a Motion to Dismiss Michael's appeal as
being untimely (Augmented R., Motion to Dismiss filed on September 3, 2013). On September
10,2013 Michael filed a response in Opposition to Heather's Motion to Dismiss, with supporting
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Affidavits (R., Vol. I page 109-155). The Clerk's certificate of service to the Decree of Divorce
shows that on June 28, 2013 the Decree was faxed to counsel for Heather and to counsel for
Michael. (R., Vol. I, p. 85). However, the facsimile number listed for Michael's counsel, which
was provided to the clerk by Heather's counsel, was incorrect. (Id.) There is a handwritten
notation on the Certificate of Service that it was "refaxed on 7/24113 to Madsen", counsel for
Michael, at Madsen's correct facsimile number (Id.). On September 17, 2013 the District court
dismissed Michael's Appeal, as untimely and further entered judgment with respect to the same.
(R., Vol. I pp. 159-161). Michael herein appeals the dismissal and judgment.

II.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Michael had only one (1) day to file his Notice of Appeal after receiving actual notice
from the Court (R., Vol. I page 85).

Heather's counsel's failure to include the correct fax

number on the Clerk's Certificate of Service created a situation such that the Clerk did not
provide actual or constructive notice to Michael of the final judgment. Accordingly, LR.C.P.
Rule 77(d) allows this Court to grant relief to Michael.
In the transcript on appeal, Heather's counsel argues that Michael's attorney had
knowledge of the proposed Decree prior to the entry of the Decree and that should have given
him sufficient oppOliunity to be prepared to appeal (Tr., p. 6, line 11; p. 8, line 5). The foregoing
argument is not the status of the law as to time for appeal and notice of final order of the Court
pursuant to LR.C.P. 77. A proposed order or decree is not a final Decree entered by the Court.
A proposed order or decree is not binding in any way and even if said order is ultimately entered
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by the Court, the grounds for appealing an entered order or decree are vastly different and
involve a myriad of different factors than objecting to the form or content of a proposed order or
decree.
Michael only received notice of the Decree of Divorce after being contacted by Heather
on July 23 when she wanted to know when her property would be distributed. See Vol., I, p.
118,

~

20. Ms. Brown stated that she no longer had an attorney but was calling based on her

receiving the Decree of Divorce from her previous attorney. Id. Michael and Michael's counsel
were unaware of the entry of the Decree of Divorce and Heather emailed it on July 23,2013 at
5 :31 p.m. Id. p. 148. The email from Heather was opened and responded to at approximately
2:08 p.m. the next day, July 24, 2013. Id. On July 24, 2013, counsel for Michael instructed his
staff to obtain a copy of the Decree of Divorce from the Courthouse as she had not sent it as she
promised during office hours. See VoL I, p. 114,

~~

2-4.

The foregoing was the first time

Michael or his counsel were informed of the possible entry of a final judgment.
On July 24, 2013, Michael's counsel's staff began contacting the court reporter in order
to determine how much a trial transcript would cost for the appeal. Id at

~

8. After research of

the potential hearing dates for transcript costs were located and relayed to the clerk, a response
was received the same day. Id at

~~

9 & 10. Thereafter, Michael's counsel's legal assistant

began attempting contact with Michael to inform him of the potential costs of filing an appeal
and to confirm the issues he wished to appeal. Id at ~7. After two days of determining whether or
not an appeal should be filed and attempts to contact Michael, a Notice of Appeal was faxed to
the District Court shortly before 5:00 p.m. on Friday, July 26, 2013; however, the transmission
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did not go through the fax machine until 5:08 p.m. See Vol. I,

~~

33 & 34. The Clerk stamped

the Notice of Appeal on Monday, July 29,2013 at 7:13 a.m., which was forty five (46) days after
the Decree was file stamped by the clerk.
It is virtually impossible for counsel to weigh the advisability and confer with a client

regarding whether or not an appeal is appropriate in one (1) day, which is what happened here.
As this court is well aware, filing a Notice of Appeal, when the appeal is not well founded in
law, could expose the client and the attorney to monetary sanctions and attorney fee awards for
filing a frivolous appeal, pursuant to I.A.R.P. Rule 11.2, Idaho Code §12-121. It was important
for the client and counsel to discuss whether or not there were actually appealable issues in the
Decree prior to filing a Notice of Appeal. One day simply does not give sufficient time to do all
of the tasks associated with determining the appealability of a case. See also Elec. Wholesale
Supply Co., Inc. v. Nielson, 136 Idaho 814,828,41 P.3d 242,256 (2001):
An award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 is proper only
where this COUli is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was "brought or
pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation. Stanley v. McDaniel,
134 Idaho 630, 7 P.3d 1107 (2000) (citing Anson v. Les Bois Race Track, Inc.,
130 Idaho 303, 305, 939 P.2d 1382,1384 (1997)); I.C. § 12-121.
III.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

(a)

Did the District Court err in Dismissing Michael's appeal as untimely?

(b)

Does IRCP 77(d) extend the time in which Michael had to file his appeal?

(c)

Is Michael entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal?

7

IV.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review from a district court ruling, acting in its appellate capacity, is for
the appellate court to review the decision to see if the issue was correctly decided. See Borley v.
Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 176,233 P.3d 102, 107 (2010), which states:
On appeal of a decision rendered by district court acting in its appellate capacity,
we directly review the district court's decision to determine whether it correctly
decided the issues presented to it on appeal. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v.
Doe, 148 Idaho 124, 126,219 P.3d 448,450 (2009).
See also State v. Schoonover, 125 Idaho 953, 954, 877 P.2d 924, 925 (Ct. App. 1994),
which states:
When an appeal is taken from a decision of the district court rendered in its
appellate capacity, we examine the record from the magistrate division
independently of, but with due regard for, the district court's decision. State v.
Barker, 123 Idaho 162, 163,845 P.2d 580,581 (Ct.App.l992).
Thus, it is for the Supreme Court to independently determine the timeliness of Michael's
filing of his Notice of Appeal and whether IRCP ned) extended the time when Michael's Notice
of Appeal was due to be filed.

V.
ARGUMENT
(a)

Did the District Court Err when it dismissed Michael's Appeal as untimely?

Herret v. Herret, 105 Idaho 358, 670 P.2d 63 (Ct.App.1983) states that the time frame for
a party to file its Notice of Appeal is tolled until the party receives actual notice ofthe judgment:
This, coupled with the fact that the clerk failed to give notice of judgment,
"affects" the time for appeal under I.R.C.P. 77(d). When the original time for
appeal expires before the appellant receives actual notice, the appellant is
deprived of any opportunity to appeal an adverse decision. Under these
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circumstances, the time for appeal begins to run anew from the date the appellant
receives actual notice. Cline v. Roemer, supra; Dustin v. Beckstrand, supra.
In the instant case Michael's counsel received actual notice from the Court forty one (41)
days after the entry of the Decree, one (1) day before the running of the time to file the appeal.
Michael's Notice of Appeal was filed with the court on July 29, 2013, within 42 days of the
court's "refaxed" service of the Decree. Michael's original Notice of Appeal was faxed to the
district court on July 26, 2013 and was received by the clerk at 5:08 p.m., therefore, since it was
received after business hours, the clerk file stamped in on July 29, 2013 (at 7:13 a.m.).
Michael's Notice of Appeal was tlled within five (5) days of his actual notice of the entry of
Decree.
Cline v. Roemer, 97 Idaho 666,667,551 P.2d 621,622 (1976) states:

It is not disputed that a clerk of the court failed to give Roemer notice of that
judgment as required by LR.C.P. 77(d). Roemer argues that until he is given
notice by the clerk, the time for appeal does not begin to run, and this appeal is
timely.
Roemer's argument failed, as the court found that Roemer had actual notice of the
judgment, pnor to the clerk of the court's mailing of said notice.

Michael's facts are

distinguishable from Cline in that Michael had neither actual nor constructive notice of the entry
of the final judgment prior to July 23,2013.

(b)

Does IRCP 77(d) extend the time in which Michael had to file his Appeal?

IRCP Rule 77(d) provides:
Immediately upon the entry of an order or judgment the clerk of the district court,
or magistrates division, shall serve a copy thereof, with the clerk's filing
stamp thereon showing the date of filing ... Lack of notice of entry of an order or
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judgment does not affect the time to appeal or to file a post-judgment motion,
or relieve or authorize the court to relieve a party for failure to appeal or file a
post-trial motion within the time allowed, except where there is no showing of
mailing by the clerk in the court records and the party affected thereby had
no actual notice. (emphasis added)
Here, the clerk waited fourteen (14) days before serving the Decree on the interested
parties, and then, due to the bad facsimile number provided to the court by Heather's counsel,
Michael was not served with notice until forty one (41) days after entry of the Decree.
Dustin v. Beckstrand, 103 Idaho 780, 786, 654 P.2d 368, 374 (1982), held: ["LR.C.P.
77(d)] specifically states that failure to comply will not relieve a party from the time limits for
appeal unless the party had no actual notice" (emphasis added).
(c)

Is Michael entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal?

Under 1. C §12-121, Michael's attorney fees and costs are appropriate if he is successful
with this appeal and if this Court makes a finding that the Respondent defended this appeal
frivolously. See Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879,231 P.3d 524 (2009).
,

Idaho Appellate Rule 40 provides for costs to a prevailing party at appeal. Additionally,
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 allows a party to request attorney fees and the Appellant so requests the
opportunity to submit a memorandum and affidavit in support if this Court so orders it. Michael
hereby requests attorney fees and costs on appeal based on the Respondent's frivolous defense.
At hearing and in their memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss as untimely,
counsel for Heather argued, in effect, that Michael had notice to appeal from the date he received
their proposed Decree of Divorce which is contrary to LR.C.P. 83 and LR.C.P. 77(d). See Tr., p.
6 Ins.11-25; pp. 7-8 and page 4 and 5 of Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, Augmented Record.
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Therefore, Heather's arguments at the District Court were not based upon law and/or based upon
a good faith argument for a change in said law and therefore frivolous.
VI.
CONCLUSION

The case law supports a dismissal if the appellant had sufficient time to prepare and file a
notice of appeal. However, in this case, one day was not sufficient time to prepare and file a
notice of appeal. The filing of the notice of appeal in this case was file stamped 46 days after
entry of judgment, but only 5 days after Michael's counsel's having received Notice of the
Decree from which he appealed.
An appellant must have sufficient time in order to file a notice of appeal. The Supreme
Court has ruled 10 days is sufficient time; but not a lesser amount of time.
Further, Appellant requests reimbursement of his costs and fees as he has been required
to appeal the District Court's decision as a result of her Motion to Dismiss Notice of Appeal.
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant, Michael Brown request this Court find that the
District Court erred in dismissing his appeal as untimely and order attorney fees and costs to
Appellant.
Respectfully submitted this

day of February, 2014.
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, PC,
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 18th day of February, 2014, two bound, true
and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF were delivered to the party shown
below by regular mail, addressed as follows:
JENNIFER K. BRUMLEY
Amendola, Doty & Brumley, PLLC
702 N. Fourth Street
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
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